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Abstract
We consider a Gaussian two-hop network where the source and the destination can communicate
only via a relay node who is both an eavesdropper and a Byzantine adversary. Both the source and the
destination nodes are allowed to transmit, and the relay receives a superposition of their transmitted
signals. We propose a new coding scheme that satisfies two requirements simultaneously: the transmitted
message must be kept secret from the relay node, and the destination must be able to detect any Byzantine
attack that the relay node might launch reliably and fast. The three main components of the scheme
are the nested lattice code, the privacy amplification and the algebraic manipulation detection (AMD)
code. Specifically, for the Gaussian two-hop network, we show that lattice coding can successfully pair
with AMD codes enabling its first application to a noisy channel model. We prove, using this new
coding scheme, that the probability that the Byzantine attack goes undetected decreases exponentially
fast with respect to the number of channel uses, while the loss in the secrecy rate, compared to the rate
achievable when the relay is honest, can be made arbitrarily small. In addition, in contrast with prior
work in Gaussian channels, the notion of secrecy provided here is strong secrecy.
This work was presented in part at International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2009, July, 2009, and the Information
Theory Workshop, ITW 2010, January 2010. This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation with Grant
CNS-0716325, and the DARPA ITMANET Program with Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy, first proposed by Shannon [1], provides confidentiality of trans-
mitted information against an adversary regardless of its computational power. Shannon proved
that if the adversary has access to the signals transmitted by the sender of the secret message
through a noiseless channel, then, to achieve perfect secrecy from the adversary, the sender and
the receiver has to share a secret key of the same length as the message. Although Shannon’s
result implied that secret communication was impractical in this setting, it was later shown
by Wyner [2] that this pessimistic result was a consequence of the noiseless channel assump-
tion. Specifically, it was shown that when the adversary has noisy observations of the signals
transmitted by the sender, a nonzero transmission rate for the secrecy message is achievable
without requiring the transmitter to pre-share a key with the receiver [2]–[4]. More recently, the
fundamental rate limits at which the secret communication can take place in the presence of an
eavesdropper were studied for a number of multi-terminal models, e.g., the broadcast channel [5],
[6], the two-way channel [7], [8], the multiple access channel [7] and the interference channel
[9], [10].
Secure communication for channel models with a relay node has been studied from a variety
of perspectives, including the relay node as a helper to the legitimate communication link [11],
or to an eavesdropper [12]. References [13]–[16] consider the case where the relay node itself
is the eavesdropper from whom the information transmitted from the source to the destination
must be kept secret. This setting, which provides theoretical foundations toward the utilization of
untrusted relay nodes in network design, is relevant in practice: The potentially untrusted routers
of today’s Internet routinely relay sensitive information for its users. The current approach is
that the authenticity and secrecy of the information is protected by security protocols assuming
these routers are limited in computational power [17]. It is interesting to address the role of
these routers if they are computational power unlimited adversaries.
To answer this question, in [8], [14], [15], as a first step, we considered the case where the
relay node was “honest but curious”. This means that the curious relay node is not trusted with
confidential messages. On the other hand, it is honest, and thus conforms to the system rules
and performs the designated relaying scheme. Reference [14] considered the three-node relay
network with such a relay. References [8], [15] considered the two-way relay channel where two
3nodes could only communicate through such a relay node. In these works, we showed that if the
relay was not trusted but honest, recruiting it to help relay information was useful in achieving
a higher secrecy rate than simply treating the relay node as an eavesdropper. This effect is most
pronounced in the two-hop model studied in [15], in which the achievable rate is 0 if the relay
node is excluded from communication, and increases to being within 1bit of the rate of having
trusted relay if the untrusted relay node is properly utilized. Similar observations can be made
in networks with multiple confidential messages [16].
It is the next natural step to consider the problem where the relay node is curious and is
potentially dishonest. This means that the relay can deviate from its designated behavior. This
can be as benign as the relay node experiencing a failure and stopping transmission, which is
obviously easy to detect. However, if the relay is a malicious entity (or is captured by one),
a more detrimental scenario can materialize. Specifically, the relay can attempt to deceive the
destination into accepting a counterfeit message by actively manipulating the signals it relays.
Such behavior is a “Byzantine attack” [18]. When the adversary is limited in computational
power, this type of attack can be detected via message authentication code or digital signatures
[17]. The security guarantee promised by these schemes is essentially based on the absence of
known effective attack strategies and the fact that their reliability can be proved if a very small
set of assumptions is made.
In this work, we tackle the case where the Byzantine adversary has unlimited computational
power. In an effort to demonstrate the simplest network which relies on an untrusted node
to communicate, we consider a two-hop network [15]. In contrast to reference [15], which
considered an honest but curious relay, we allow the relay node to actively modify the transmitted
signal in any way it desires. The goal of the destination thus becomes detecting the message
that has been altered fast and reliably whenever the relay node chooses to do so.
Toward accomplishing this goal, there are several known results that can be leveraged, each
with their own limitations. For example, Byzantine attack detection can be viewed as an au-
thentication problem, by treating the counterfeit message W ′ as a message from a “wrong”
source node. An information theoretic secrecy scheme with an authentication capability was
proposed in [19]. However, like other message authentication codes [20], the source has to share
an authentication key with the destination beforehand.
It is known, on the other hand, that to detect the Byzantine attack, which is a milder require-
4ment than authentication, it is not essential to share keys. In reference [21], the so-called algebraic
manipulation detection (AMD) code was used for encoding the data from the source node which
ensures the probability that the Byzantine attack succeeds can be made arbitrarily small with
an arbitrarily small loss in rate. A limitation of this scheme is that it has to be used along with
a secrecy sharing scheme that has certain linearity property [21], which is easily fulfilled in a
noiseless network as shown in [18], [22]. Indeed, in [22], we considered a deterministic two-hop
network and it was shown that by using AMD code, the probability that the Byzantine adversary
wins decreases exponentially fast with respect to the total number of channel uses n′ while the
loss in rate can be made arbitrarily small. On the other hand, for noisy channels, secret sharing
schemes generally fail to have the required linearity property. As a result, to date the strongest
result that could have been obtained is that, for a noisy two-hop network, the probability that a
Byzantine attack goes undetected decreases exponentially only with respect to
√
n′ in [22].
The main contribution of this work is to demonstrate that for the Gaussian two-hop network,
the probability that a Byzantine attack goes undetected, i.e., the adversary wins, also decreases
exponentially fast with respect to n′, while the loss in secrecy rate can be made arbitrarily
small. Hence, the same result achievable for the deterministic two-hop network is attainable for
this noisy two-hop network. This represents a departure from traditional security approaches
that assume a noiseless bit pipe for communication and brings the physical characteristics of
the channel into the picture while providing a guarantee thought to be possible only with the
noiseless setting. The key to prove this result is the introduction of a new strong secrecy scheme.
Its existence is proved via the representation theorem derived in [10], [23] and the privacy
amplification technique presented in [24], [25]. Compared to previously known strong secrecy
schemes, the main differences are:
1) Unlike the randomly generated codes in [26], the decoder of the new scheme is linear for
certain rate configurations.
2) Unlike [10], [23], the codeword consists of a single lattice point rather than multiple
lattice points. This allows the mutual information between the confidential message and
eavesdropper’s observation to decrease exponentially with respect to n′. Hence the notion
of secrecy provided by this scheme is stronger than commonly used strong secrecy scheme,
which only requires this mutual information to vanish with respect to n′.
5The first item provides the linear property required by AMD code. The stronger-than-usual
secrecy notion in the second item is essential in preserving the Byzantine detection performance
offered by AMD code. As will be shown in Section VI, the commonly used strong secrecy
notion, as in [25], [27], is insufficient for this purpose.
There is other work in Byzantine detection from which this work differs. Notably, reference
[28] proposed to use the sender of the confidential message to monitor the behavior of the relay
node. This so-called “watchdog” scheme could also have been used in the setting we consider if
the message in transmission were not to be kept secret from the relay node. However, when the
message is confidential, using a “watchdog” is not possible. This is because there is no direct link
between the two legitimate communicating nodes which means the sender has no information
regarding the signals transmitted by the destination. As will be explained in Section IV, these
signals are necessary in order to deploy cooperative jamming [7] to keep the message secret
from the relay node, see also [15]. Since the received signals at the relay is garbled by signals
transmitted by the destination, so are the signals transmitted from it. This prevents the source
from detecting whether the relay misbehaves by just looking at its transmitted signals without
the knowledge of the signals transmitted from the destination.
This work should also be differentiated from references [29]–[32]. In these works, the adver-
saries can also actively manipulate the signals received by the destination. However, the purpose
is to find a way for reliable communication in the presence of such adversaries carrying out
the worst-case attack. In the two-hop network considered in this work, this is not possible since
there is no direct link between the two legitimate communicating nodes. Hence, when Byzantine
behavior is detected, we need to forgo the relay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the system
model and formulate the Byzantine detection and secrecy problem. In Section III, we review
known Byzantine detection schemes, in particular, the AMD code and describe the technical
obstacles to be overcome in this work. Section IV-VI describe the main components of strongly
secure scheme proposed in this work and how it can be combined with AMD codes for Byzantine
detection purpose. Section VII concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. The Gaussian two-hop network. Phase 1 is indicated by solid line, and phase 2 by dashed line. R/E: Relay/Eavesdropper.
Y1 is not shown.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The Gaussian two-hop network with a Byzantine relay node is shown in Figure 1. In this
model, node 1 wants to send a confidential message W to node 2. Since it can not communicate
with node 2 directly, it recruits the help of a relay node, who is not trusted with the message
W . The signal received by the relay node consists of the signals transmitted by both node 1 and
2, and the signal broadcasted by the relay node is heard by both nodes as well. These are fitting
assumptions for wireless communication. Let Xi, i = 1, 2, Xr denote the signal transmitted by
node 1, 2 and the relay. Let Yi, i = 1, 2 and Yr denote their received signals respectively. After
normalizing the channel gains, we have
Yr = X1 +X2 + Zr (1)
Y2 = Xr + ZR, Y1 = hXr + Z
′
R (2)
where Zr, ZR and Z ′R are independent Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
variance. h is the normalized channel gain. Since Y1 is not used in the scheme described in this
work, it is omitted in Figure 1 for clarity. We assume each node is half-duplex. For simplicity,
we assume the relay node transmits during half of all channel uses. Without loss of generality,
we assume node 1 and 2 do not transmit when the relay node transmits since the relay node
can not receive and relay their transmitted signals simultaneously. We also assume during the n
channel uses that the relay node transmits, its transmission power averaged over these channel
uses should not exceed P¯ . During the remaining n channel uses that node 1 and 2 may transmit,
7the transmission power of each of these two nodes averaged over these channel uses should not
exceed P¯ .
We assume the Byzantine adversary at the relay node can employ any stochastic function to
compute its current transmitted signal. Let Xr,i be its transmitted signal at the ith channel use.
Let Mr be the local randomness available to the relay node. Let Y i−1r be the signals it received
in the past. Let W be the confidential message it is currently relaying. Let fi be the relaying
function. Then the attacker (relay) can compute:
Xr,i = fi(Mr, Y
i−1
r ,W ) (3)
It might seem inconsistent at first glance to assume the Byzantine adversary knows the message,
which should be kept secret from the relay node in the first place. However, when the possible
choice for W are limited, for example, to being binary, the attacker has a non-negligible
probability of success for guessing it. This can also happen when the channel is used to transmit
data with high redundancy and stringent latency requirement, so that adjacent messages are
highly likely to share the same value. If, somehow, the adversary has access to earlier messages,
it can guess the value of the current message with high probability of success. As a result, it is a
common practice to design a reliable message authentication scheme by assuming the adversary
knows the message [20, Definition 4.2]. Here too, we follow this convention.
The Byzantine detection problem for secure communication using an untrusted relay can be
stated as follows:
Let the total number of channel uses be n′ = 2n, during which each node transmits during n
channel uses. Let Wˆ be the estimate of W computed by the destination, i.e., node 2, based on
its observation. Note that because the relay can be a Byzantine adversary, node 2 may or may
not accept Wˆ as a genuine message from node 1 based on certain criteria.
Definition 1: [20] A function of n, γn is negligible if for any polynomial of n with a finite
degree poly(n), we have:
lim
n→∞
poly(n)γn = 0 (4)
We wish to find the secrecy rate Re of W , defined as
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n′
H (W ) (5)
8such that the following conditions hold:
1) When the relay node is honest, and W is uniformly distributed over the message set, then
both Pr
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
and
Pr
(
Wˆ is not accepted by Node 2|W = Wˆ
)
(6)
should be negligible as per Definition 1. Hence, the transmission of W is reliable.
2) For ∀w0 in the message set, the probability that the adversary wins, Pr(A wins), given
by
Pr(A wins) = Pr
(
Wˆ is accepted by Node 2|W = w0,W 6= Wˆ
)
(7)
is negligible. Hence any modification on W is detected reliably.
3) I (W ; Y nr ) is negligible. Since Y nr is the observation of the eavesdropper, this means the
information that the adversary has regarding the value of W is negligible.
Remark 1: Observe that the condition of reliable Byzantine detection in 2) is independent
from the distribution of W .
III. KNOWN BYZANTINE DETECTION SCHEMES
As mentioned in the introduction, when there are no secrecy concerns at the relay, whether
the relay is honest or not can be checked by the source node, i.e., node 1, by examining Y1.
However, since there are secrecy constraints in our model, applying sender-based Byzantine
detection approach is not feasible. Therefore, we will concentrate on a receiver-based approach
called algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code in the sequel.
AMD code was formally defined in [21]. An AMD codeword is composed of three parts:
{s, x, h}, where s is the d× 1 vector on GF(qr) representing the message. The component x is
called the random seed and is generated from GF(qr) by the encoder itself. h is the hash tag
and is computed according to the hash rule:
h = xd+2 +
d∑
i=1
six
i (8)
where si is the ith component of s and the addition and multiplication is defined over GF(qr).
Suppose the node 2 receives s′, x′, h′, where s′ 6= s. Let ∆x = x′ − x. ∆h = h′ − h. Then [21]
has the following result:
9Theorem 1: [21, Theorem 2] Assume at least one of s′ − s,∆x,∆h is not zero. If the
distribution of x conditioned on {∆x,∆h, s′, s} is uniform over the field GF(qr), q being a
prime, and d + 2 is not divisible by q, then the probability that the hash rule (8) holds for
{s′, x′, h′} is bounded by d+1
qr
.
Remark 2: The rate of the AMD code is d
d+2
. The rate can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by
choosing a large enough value for d.
On the other hand, an AMD codeword can be represented by less than (d + 2)r log2 q + 1
bits. Hence, if we fix d and q, the codeword length is a linear function of r. Consequently, for
a given code rate, the probability that {s′, x′, h′} can pass the hash rule check (8) decreases
exponentially fast with respect to the codeword length.
Despite the excellent performance of the AMD code, applying it in a noisy channel is
difficult. This is exemplified by the condition in Theorem 1: The distribution of x conditioned
on {∆x,∆h, s′, s} must be uniform over the field GF(qr). In a noisy channel, in general, ∆x
and x are not independent. In the two-hop network considered in this work, this can be seen
from the expression of ∆x. Let g be the decoding function used by node 2. Let Y n2 be the signal
received by node 2 if relay is honest. Otherwise, we denote it with Y˜ n2 . Assuming the decoding
result is correct at all nodes if the relay is honest. In this case, ∆x is given by:
∆x = x
′ − x (9)
=g
(
Y˜ n2 , X
n
2
)
− g (Y n2 , Xn2 ) (10)
By observing (10), we notice the condition in Theorem 1 can be fulfilled if g is linear in its
first parameter and Y˜ n2 − Y n2 is independent from x. In general, g is not linear. Even if this is
the case, it is also difficult to achieve independence between Y˜ n2 − Y n2 and x. Since both Y˜ n2
and Y n2 are signals transmitted by the relay corrupted by the channel noise, the joint distribution
of Y˜ n2 − Y n2 and x can be made close to an independent distribution if the relay node has
negligible information regarding the value of x. But it remains to see whether the performance
guarantee in Theorem 1 can be preserved when Y˜ n2 − Y n2 and x are almost independent rather
than truly independent. In the sequel, we will propose a strong secrecy scheme that overcomes
these problems.
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IV. LATTICE CODING SCHEME
We first briefly review the communication scheme when the relay is “honest but curious”, on
top of which we will build the strong secrecy scheme and the Byzantine detection scheme in
the sequel.
Since each node is half-duplex, naturally we have a two-phase scheme. In phase one, nodes 1
and 2 transmit, and the relay node receives. In phase two, the relay transmits. For simplicity, we
assume that each phase occupies the same number of channel uses. It was shown in [15] that
these two phases can be used to facilitate the transmission of the confidential message W from
node 1 to 2: The channel alternates between phase one and phase two. During phase one, node
1 transmits the confidential message via X1 and at the same time node 2 sends a signal X2 to
jam the relay node. During phase two, the relay node transmits to node 2 based on the signal it
received during phase one. Since node 2 knows X2, it can subtract it to obtain a clean signal.
The relay node, however, does not know X2 and hence can only observe a noisy version of X1.
Intuitively, this means node 1 can transmit to node 2 at a rate higher than the relay node can
decode, and that this excess rate can be used to convey confidential messages. This idea was
formalized in [15] using compress-and-forward relaying and in [23] using compute-and-forward
relaying. In this work, we focus on the compute-and-forward scheme as it offers the algebraic
structure that facilitates detection of a Byzantine attack.
In the compute-and-forward scheme, the signals transmitted by the two legitimate nodes are
taken from the same nested lattice codebook. This scheme was first proposed in [33] for a
Gaussian two-way relay channel without eavesdroppers. Later, the scheme was used in [23] as
a building block to transmit confidential messages when the relay is honest but curious, i.e., is
an eavesdropper but not a Byzantine adversary. The lattice coding scheme is described next for
completeness:
We begin by introducing basic notations for the nested lattice structure: For a lattice Λc, the
modulus operation x mod Λc is defined as x mod Λc = x− argmint∈Λc d(x, t), where d(x, t) is
the Euclidean distance between x and t. The fundamental region of a lattice V(Λc) is defined as
the set {x : x mod Λc = x}. A pair of N-dimensional lattices {Λ,Λc} is said to have a nested
structure if Λc ⊂ Λ [34].
Now consider a pair of N-dimensional nested lattice pair {Λ,Λc} which is properly designed
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as in [34]. The signal transmitted by each node is given by
XNi =
(
tNi + d
N
i
)
mod Λc, i = 1, 2 (11)
where tNi ∈ Λ ∩ V (Λc), and dNi , i = 1, 2 are two fixed vectors in V (Λc) and are known by
the relay node. For our purpose, tN1 will be computed from the confidential message. tN2 is
independent from tN1 and is chosen from Λ ∩ V (Λc) according to a uniform distribution. As a
result, XN2 = tN2 +dN2 mod Λc serves as the jamming signal to confuse the untrusted relay node.
An honest relay node will then decode tN1 + tN2 mod Λc and transmit tN1 + tN2 + dN3 mod Λc
during phase two, where dN3 is a fixed vector in V (Λc) and is known by node 2. Node 2 then
decodes tˆN = tN1 + tN2 mod Λc from the signal it received during phase two. An estimate of tN1 ,
denoted by tˆN1 , is then by computed from tˆN − tN2 mod Λc.
Define |S| be the cardinality of a set S. Define R0 as
R0 =
1
N
log2 |Λ ∩ V (Λc) | (12)
Then it was shown in [33] that, if
R0 <
1
2
log2(
1
2
+ P ) (13)
the probability Pr(tˆN1 6= tN1 ) decreases exponentially with respect to N .
Remark 3: It is clear that if the relay chooses to transmit tN3 + dN3 mod Λc for some arbitrary
tN3 ∈ Λ ∩ V (Λc), then node 2 will be forced to accept a message that is not originated from
node 1. This shows that unless some proper measure is taken, Byzantine attack can quite easily
succeed in this scenario.
Remark 4: dNi , i = 1, 2, 3 are conventionally defined as random variables uniformly distributed
over V(Λc) [34]. The reason of defining them to be random is that it is easier to analyze the
average error performance of an ensemble of lattice code books parameterized by the dithering
vectors than to analyze the error performance of a specific lattice code book [35]. However,
from the result on the average performance, we can also claim that there must exist some
fixed dNi , i = 1, 2, 3, which corresponds to fixed lattice codebooks in the ensemble, and these
dNi , i = 1, 2, 3 also provide vanishing error probability and meet the average power constraints
[10]. Hence in the sequel we assume dNi , i = 1, 2, 3 are fixed.
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Fig. 2. The lattice input Wiretap Channel
V. USING NESTED LATTICE CODES TO PROVIDE STRONG SECRECY
For the lattice coding scheme described in Section IV, the two-hop network is equivalent
to the lattice input wiretap channel shown in Figure 2. The main channel takes input tN1 ∈
Λ ∩ V(Λc), and produces output tˆN1 . The eavesdropper channel also takes input tN1 , and has the
same observation as the signals received by the relay node in the two-hop network. The only
difference from the original two-hop network is that in the two-hop network, it takes another
N channel uses for the relay to relay the lattice point to node 2 during which node 1 and 2 do
not transmit. Here, to simplify the argument, we omit this detail and will take these additional
channel uses into account when we revisit the two-hop network in Section VI. Here, we simply
assume that in the lattice-input wiretap channel, the transmitter transmits in each channel use
and its average power constraint is given by P .
In the sequel, we will design a coding scheme for the lattice-input wiretap channel to transmit
a confidential message W reliably such that the following strong secrecy condition holds:
I(W ; Y Nr ) < exp(−α¯N), α¯ > 0 (14)
A sufficient condition for (14) to hold is:
I(W ; Y¯ Nr ) < exp(−α¯N), α¯ > 0 (15)
where Y¯ Nr is obtained by subtracting the channel noise ZNr from Y Nr :
Y¯ Nr = (t
N
1 + d
N
1 ) mod Λc + (t
N
2 + d
N
2 ) mod Λc (16)
A. Strongly Secure Scheme
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1) When Λc = qΛ for a prime q: The self-similar nested lattice code with prime nesting ratio,
i.e., Λc = qΛ, is a special case of the good nested lattice ensemble proposed in [34, Section 7].
We first consider this case since when q is a prime, the set (Λ + dN) ∩ V (Λc) is isomorphic to
a finite field, as shown by the following lemma:
Lemma 1: When Λc = qΛ for a prime q and the generation matrix of Λ has full rank,
(Λ + dN) ∩ V (Λc) , for the modulus-Λc plus operation, is isomorphic to the group of a finite
field GF(qN).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 5: The isomorphism in Lemma 1 is not affected by the choice of d. The fixed dithering
vector d is simply used to control the average power of the lattice code book.
As we will show later in the proof of Theorem 2, the isomorphism property proved by Lemma 1
allows the resulting decoder to be linear and proves to be of critical importance in the Byzantine
detection scheme in Section VI.
The next theorem declares the existence of the strong secrecy scheme.
Theorem 2: For a given constant ε > 0 that can be arbitrarily small, assume q is a prime
large enough such that
1− 1 + ε
log2 q
> 0 (17)
Then for an integer r, such that
0 ≤ r ≤ N
(
l− 1 + ε
log2 q
)
(18)
there exists a linear mapping g from GF(q)N to GF(q)r such that
1) g has full row rank r.
2) When tNi , i = 1, 2 are uniformly distributed over (Λ + dNi ) ∩ V (Λc) and are independent
of each other, there exists a positive constant β such that
I
(
g
(
tN1
)
; Y¯ Nr
)
≤ 2e−βN (19)
Before proving the theorem, we need several supporting results:
First, the following representation theorem from [23] is useful:
Theorem 3: [23] For any u1, u2, such that ui ∈ V (Λc) , i = 1, 2,
2∑
k=1
uk is uniquely determined
by {T, 2∑
k=1
uk mod Λc}, where T is an integer such that 1 ≤ T ≤ 2N .
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Based on Theorem 3, Y¯ Nr in (16) can be represented by {(
∑2
i=1(t
N
i + d
N
i )) mod Λc, T}. Since
dNi , i = 1, 2 are known by each node, this means Y¯ Nr in (16) can be represented by {(tN1 +
tN2 ) mod Λc, T}.
We also need the following result which says most matrices have full rank:
Lemma 2: Let G be taken from the set of linear mappings from GF(q)N to GF(q)r according
to a uniform distribution. Hence G can be represented as a matrix over GF(q) with r rows and
N columns. The probability that G has full row rank is greater than 1− qr−N .
Proof: Let gi, i = 1, ..., r be the ith row of G. Then G does not have full row rank if and
only if
a1g1 + a2g2 + ... + argr = 0, ai ∈ GF(q) (20)
Since at least one ai has to be non-zero, there are qr − 1 possible choices for ai.
For each choice of {ai}, since one ai is not zero, there are qN(r−1) solutions for {gi}. Hence
there are at most qN(r−1)(qr − 1) Gs that do not have full row rank. There are qNr possible Gs
in all, each chosen with equal probability. Hence the probability that G does not have full row
rank smaller than qr−N , and we have Lemma 2.
Finally, we need the following results on privacy amplification [24], which we state here for
completeness: We begin with a couple of useful definitions:
Definition 2: For a discrete random variable X , the Re´nyi entropy H2(X) is defined as
H2(X) = − log2
∑
x
Pr(X = x)2 (21)
The Shannon entropy H(X) is defined as
H(X) = −∑
x
Pr(X = x) log2 Pr(X = x) (22)
Definition 3: [24, Definition 1] A set of functions A → B is a class of universal hash function
if for a function g taken from the set according to a uniform distribution, and x1, x2 ∈ A, x1 6= x2,
the probability that g(x1) = g(x2) holds is at most 1/|B|.
We next state the results based on these definitions:
Lemma 3: [24] The set of linear mapping as defined in Lemma 2 is a class of universal hash
function.
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Theorem 4: [24, Corollary 4] Let G be selected according to a uniform distribution from a
class of universal hash function from A to GF(q)r. For two random variables A,B, A being
defined over A, if for a constant c, H2(A|B = b) > c, then
H(G(A)|G, B = b) > r log2 q −
2r log2 q−c
ln 2
(23)
With these preparations, we are now ready to prove Theorem 2:
Proof of Theorem 2: Define a⊕b as a+b mod Λc. Then for the distribution for tNi , i = 1, 2
stated in Theorem 2, tN1 ⊕ tN2 is independent from tN1 . Therefore we have:
H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN
)
= H2
(
tN1
)
= N log2 q (24)
Let T be the integer defined in Theorem 3. Then according to [36, P 106, Theorem 5.2] [25,
Lemma 3], for a given integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ 2N and tN ∈ Λ∩V(Λc), with probability 1−2−(s/2−1):
H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN , T = a
)
≥ H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN
)
− log2 |T | − s (25)
=N (log2 q − 1)− s (26)
In Lemma 1, we have shown that if Λc = qΛ, with q being prime, then Λ∩V(Λc) is isomorphic
to GF(qN). The isomorphism is with respect to the addition operation defined in these two sets.
Since tN1 ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λc), we can write tN1 ∈ GF(qN). Moreover, since GF(qN) is isomorphic
to GF(q)N in terms of the addition operation defined in these two sets, we can further write
tN1 ∈ GF(q)N . Let G be taken from the set of linear mappings from GF(q)N to GF(q)r according
to a uniform distribution. Then G(tN1 ) is well defined.
According to Lemma 3, G is a universal hash function. Hence, according to Theorem 4, we
have:
H
(
G
(
tN1
)
|G, tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN , T = a
)
≥ r log2 q −
2r log2 q−c
ln 2
(27)
where c is given by (26):
c = N(log2 q − 1)− s (28)
Since depending on the value of tN and a equation (26) holds with probability 1− 2−(s/2−1),
from (27), we have
H
(
G
(
tN1
)
|G, tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T
)
≥
(
1− 2−(s/2−1)
)(
r log2 q −
2r log2 q−c
ln 2
)
(29)
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Note that
H(G(tN1 )|G) ≤ r log2 q (30)
Hence in order for I(G(tN1 ); tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T |G) to be negligible, we expect 2−(s/2−1) and 2r logq −c
to decrease exponentially with respect to N . To achieve this, we choose s = ε′N , where 0 <
ε′ < log2 q − 1 so that c in (28) is positive. We choose r such that for δ > 0:
r log2 q < c−Nδ (31)
= N (log2 q − 1)− s−Nδ (32)
= N (log2 q − 1− ε′ − δ) (33)
We observe that if (31)-(33) are satisfied, 2r logq −c to decrease exponentially with respect to N .
We also observe that if we let ε = ε′ + δ, then (31)-(33) lead to (18).
For these choices of r and s, from (29) and (30), we observe that there exists β > 0, such
that
I
(
G
(
tN1
)
; tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T |G
)
≤ e−βN (34)
We next use the fact that for sufficiently large N , most Gs have full row rank as shown in
Lemma 2. Therefore, for a uniform distribution for tNi , i = 1, 2, tN1 and tN2 being independent,
there must exists a G = g, such that
1) g has full rank.
2) From Markov inequality,
I
(
G
(
tN1
)
; tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T |G = g
)
≤ 2e−βN (35)
Finally, we use Theorem 3, which says tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T in (35) can be replaced by Y¯ Nr . Hence we
have proved Theorem 2.
The secrecy generation scheme described above will not be useful if the generated random
variable, g(tN1 ), can not serve as the random seed, x, in the AMD tuple as described in Section III.
Hence we need the following lemma on the distribution of g(tN1 ).
Lemma 4: If tN1 is uniformly distributed over GF(qN), and g has full row rank, Then g(tN1 )
is uniformly distributed over GF(qr).
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Proof: Since g has full row rank, and its elements are taken from the field GF(q), it can
always be represented as
g = [I,P]O (36)
where O is an N×N invertible matrix. Hence O(tN1 ) is uniformly distributed over GF(qN). I is
an r× r identity matrix. Since the sum of any two independent field elements will be uniformly
distributed if one of the field element is uniformly distributed, it can be verified that g(tN1 ) is
uniformly distributed over GF(qr).
2) The General Case: When (Λ,Λc) does not have the self-similar relationship as described
in Section V-A1, we can still extract a strongly secure random variable from a lattice point using
the same method as shown in Section V-A1. The only difference is that the map between the
extracted random variable and the lattice point will not be linear.
Consider a general N dimensional nested lattice codebook Λ ∩ V (Λc). Recall that R0, as
defined in (12), is the rate of the codebook. Assume R0 > 1. Let ⌊x⌋ be the operation that
rounds x to the nearest integer less than or equal to x. Define N0 as
N0 = ⌊log2 |Λ ∩ V (Λc) |⌋ (37)
Then
N0 ≥ NR0 − 1 (38)
Choose the subset K of the codebook (Λ+dN1 )∩V (Λc) that yields the minimal average decoding
error probability with the lattice decoder and has size |K| = 2N0 . Define v as the one-to-one
mapping from K to GF(2N0). Then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: Let ε > 0 be a constant such that
R0 − 1− ε > 0 (39)
Then for an integer r0, such that
0 ≤ r0 ≤ N(R0 − 1− ε) (40)
there exists a linear mapping g from GF(2)N0 to GF(2)r0 such that
1) g has full row rank r0.
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2) When tN1 is uniformly distributed over K, tN2 is uniformly distributed over (Λ+dN2 )∩V (Λc),
tN1 , t
N
2 are independent of each other, we have
I
(
g
(
v(tN1 )
)
; Y¯ Nr
)
≤ 2e−βN (41)
for a certain β > 0.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, and is given in Appendix B.
3) Encoder Construction: Although both Theorem 2 and Theorem 5 can be used to prove the
existence of an encoder with rate arbitrarily close to max{R0 − 1, 0}, with R0 defined in (12),
only Theorem 5 is used in the sequel to transmit confidential messages. Theorem 2 is only used
to generate strongly secure random seeds, for which Theorem 2 is sufficient by itself. Hence in
this section, we discuss Theorem 5 only. The argument we use is as follows:
For a given g that has full row rank, let g′ be (N0 − r0)×N0 matrix such that

 g′
g

 is a
square matrix that is invertible. Define S and S′ such that
 g′(N0−r0)×N0
gr0×N0

 v(tN1 ) =

 S′(N0−r0)×1
Sr0×1

 (42)
Then S = g(v(tN1 )). Define A as the inverse of

 g′
g

, then the encoder is given by:
tN1 = v
−1A

 S′(N0−r0)×1
Sr0×1

 (43)
where S ∈ GF(2r0) be the input to the encoder. We assume S is uniformly distributed over
GF(2r0). tN1 ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λc) is the output of the encoder. S′ represents the randomness in the
encoding scheme. We observe that, if {S′(N0−r0)×1,Sr0×1} is uniformly distributed over GF(2)N0
and (43) is used as the encoder, tN1 is also uniformly distributed over the set K. Since G = g
is chosen when tN1 has a uniform distribution over K, this means that when (43) is used as an
encoder, the secrecy constraint in Theorem 5, (41), still holds.
Since the encoder (43) uses N channel uses to transmit a r0 × 1 binary vector, the achieved
secrecy rate is
Re = [R0 − 1− ε]+ (44)
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where [x]+ equals x if x ≥ 0 or 0 otherwise. According to (13), this means Re can be arbitrarily
close to [
1
2
log2(
1
2
+ P )− 1
]+
(45)
B. Comparison with Other Wiretap Coding Schemes
Although this work leverages the same technique, namely, privacy amplification as [25], it is
distinct from [25] in the following aspects:
Reference [25] proposed that one can invoke any weakly secure scheme multiple times and
extract a strongly secure key using privacy amplification. Let Θ(x) denote the set of functions
ax+ b, a > 0, b 6= 0, and a, b are constants. In our model, each invocation of the weakly secure
scheme involves Θ(N) channel uses, where N is the dimension of the lattice code. Suppose this
scheme is invoked for M times. Then the total number of channel uses is MN . Let K denote
the generated key and Y MNr be the signals observed by the eavesdropper, then the result in [25]
implies 1
lim
M→∞
I
(
K; Y MNr
)
= 0 (46)
In this work, g(tN1 ) in Theorem 2 can be viewed as the strongly secure key. Based on Theorem 2,
we have
lim
N→∞
− 1
N
log2 I
(
K; Y Nr
)
> 0 (47)
Comparing (47) to (46), we observe (47) is stronger. This is because the strongly secure scheme
in Section V-A leverages results specific to nested lattice code, namely Theorem 3 and extracts
the key from a single lattice point instead of a sequence of lattice points. Hence, while the
scheme we proposed in Section V-A is not as generally applicable as [25] does, we observe that
it performs better than applying [25] directly to our model.
1To simplify the argument, we have omitted several details from [25] including “error reconciliation”. Interested readers can
refer to [25] for further details.
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VI. BYZANTINE DETECTION
In this section, we describe how to transmit the AMD code using the strong secrecy scheme
proposed in Section V and analyze its performance.
To transmit {x, h}, we use the idea of “message authentication codes with key manipulation
security” in [21, Section 4]. Note that for a given s, the distribution of hash tag h is in general
not uniform. Hence the distribution of h depends on the distribution of s. However, if we want to
use the strongly secure scheme in Section V-A to transmit h and desire to fix the hash function
G = g, we need to know the distribution of h beforehand, which is difficult since the distribution
of s is hard to determine beforehand. To solve this problem, we introduce another random seed
k from GF(qr), which can be generated via the linear coding scheme in Section V-A. From
Lemma 4, k is uniformly distributed over GF(qr). Hence h can be transmitted by using k as a
one time pad.
The transmission is hence divided into 4 stages:
1) x ∈ GF(qr) is extracted from an N dimensional lattice code as shown in Section V-A1.
2) k ∈ GF(qr) is extracted from an N dimensional lattice code as shown in Section V-A1.
Let kˆ be the estimate of it computed by node 2. Let P1 be the average power per channel
use of the N dimensional lattice code.
3) u = h ⊕ k is transmitted by node 1 via the conventional two-hop protocol using r-
dimensional lattice code with log2 q per channel use. In this stage, node 2 remains silent.
Let uˆ be the estimate of it computed by node 2. Let P2 be the power per channel use of
the r dimensional lattice code.
4) s is transmitted via the encoder described in Section V-A2 with P = P¯ (1 − εP ). εP is a
positive constant that can be made arbitrarily small. Let sˆ be the estimate of s computed
by node 2, which corresponds to s′ in Theorem 1.
Remark 6: Note that both P1 and P2 are only functions of the rate of their respective lattice
code, which is log2 q. Hence P1 and P2 are only functions of q. Therefore, we can increase r,
while leaving P1, P2 unchanged.
We next derive the following important lemma which implies the condition of AMD code
stated in Theorem 1 can be fulfilled using the transmission scheme described above:
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Lemma 5: Let s0 be any d× 1 vector on GF(qr). Then
I (x; ∆x,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) < 4 exp(−βN) (48)
where β is a positive number defined in Theorem 2.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 5 is based on the strong secrecy offered by Theorem 2 and
Theorem 5, and is provided in Appendix C.
Remark 7: Lemma 5 implies that
I (x; ∆x,∆h, sˆ|s) < 4 exp(−βN) (49)
Since I(x; s) = 0, this means
I (x; ∆x,∆h, sˆ, s) < 4 exp(−βN) (50)
Remark 8: Note that I (x; ∆x,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) does not dependent on the error exponents of the
lattice decoder. Also, it does not depend on whether s0 is known by the attacker beforehand.
We next link Lemma 5 and Theorem 1 with Pinsker’s inequality which leads to the following
main result of this paper:
Theorem 6: For the Gaussian two-hop network, for a rate smaller but arbitrarily close to 0.5Re
given by (45), and a total number of channel uses 2n = Θ(N):
1) When the relay is honest, the confidential message W can be transmitted at this rate such
that all the three terms Pr(W 6= Wˆ ), I(W ; Y nr ) and
Pr
(
Wˆ is not accepted by Node 2|W = Wˆ
)
(51)
decrease exponentially fast with N .
2) When the relay is not honest, the probability that the Byzantine attack goes undetected,
i.e., the probability that the adversary wins, denoted as Pr(A wins) in (7), decreases
exponentially fast with N .
Proof: We use “HRH” for “hash rule holds” when for s 6= s′,
xd+2 +
d∑
i=1
six
i = x′d+2 +
d∑
i=1
s′ix
′i +∆h (52)
22
This means the message s′, x′, h′ will be accepted by node 2. Hence the probability that the
adversary wins is given by:
Pr (A wins)
=
∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
Pr (HRH|x,∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′)
Pr (x|∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′) Pr (∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0)
(53)
Define Q(A wins) as the term (53) with Pr (x|∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′) replaced by Pr(x).
Q (A wins)
=
∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
Pr (HRH|x,∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′)
Pr (x) Pr (∆h,∆x, s
′|s = s0)
(54)
Note that Q (A wins) would be the probability that the Byzantine adversary wins if x and
∆h,∆x, s, s
′ are truly independent. To evaluate the effect of being otherwise, we next bound the
difference between Pr (A wins) and Q (A wins).
|Pr (A wins)−Q (A wins) | (55)
≤ ∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
Pr (HRH|x,∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′)
|Pr (x|∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′)− Pr (x) |
Pr (∆h,∆x, s
′|s = s0)
(56)
≤ ∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
|Pr (x|∆h,∆x, s = s0, s′)− Pr (x) |
Pr (∆h,∆x, s
′|s = s0)
(57)
=
∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
|Pr (x|∆h,∆x, s′, s = s0)− Pr (x|s = s0) |
Pr (∆h,∆x, s
′|s = s0)
(58)
=
∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′ 6=s0
|Pr (x,∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0)− Pr (x|s = s0) Pr (∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0) | (59)
≤ ∑
x,∆x
∆h,s
′
|Pr (x,∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0)− Pr (x|s = s0) Pr (∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0) | (60)
Then we use Pinsker’s inequality [37, Theorem 2.33]:
I(A;B) ≥ 1
2 ln 2
D2(p (A,B) , p (A) p (B)) (61)
where D(p(x), q(x)) = ∑x |p(x)− q(x)|.
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Let p(A) be Pr(x|s = s0). Let p(B) be Pr(∆h,∆x, s′|s = s0). Let p(A,B) be given by:
p(A,B) = Pr(x,∆h,∆x, s
′|s = s0) (62)
Then from Lemma 5, (60) is bounded by
√
(8 ln 2) exp(−βN) because of Pinsker’s inequality.
Hence we have:
|Pr (A wins)−Q (A wins) | ≤
√
(8 ln 2) exp(−βN) (63)
From Theorem 1, Q (A wins) is bounded by d+1
qr
. Hence
Pr (A wins) ≤
√
(8 ln 2) exp(−βN) + d+ 1
qr
(64)
Each {s} conveys dr log2 q bits of information, where r is defined in Theorem 2. Recall that
the total number of channel uses is denoted by 2n. The relay node transmits during n channel
uses. Node 1 transmits during the other n channel uses. When node 1 transmits, node 2 may or
may not transmit depending on which of the 4 stages described at the beginning of this section
is being executed. For the four-stage transmission scheme, n is given by:
n = 2N + r +
⌈
dr log2 q
NRe
⌉
N (65)
This is because N channel uses are needed to transmit x or k, and r channel uses are needed
to transmit k ⊕ h. The third term in (65) is the number of channel uses needed to transmit s,
where ⌈x⌉ is the operation that rounds x to the nearest integer greater than or equal to x.
The overall secrecy rate RT is given by
RT =
dr log2 q
2n
(66)
From (65), we observe RT can be made arbitrarily close to 0.5Re by choosing a sufficiently
large d.
Let PT denote the transmission power averaged over the channel uses during which a node
transmits. Based on the four stage transmission scheme, PT of node 1 and the relay are the
same. PT of node 2 is smaller since it does not transmit during the third stage. Hence we only
need to make sure PT of node 1 does not exceed the power constraint P . PT of node 1 is given
by
PT =
P12N + P2r + P
(
dr log2 q
Re
)
n
(67)
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PT can be made arbitrarily close to but strictly smaller than P¯ by choosing a sufficiently large
d and a sufficiently small εP .
Once RT and PT is fixed, d is fixed. On the other hand, as shown by (65) and (18), for a
fixed d, n increases linearly with respect to N .
Select r as in (18) such that r increases linearly with respect to N . Then, from (64), we
observe that the probability that the adversary wins decreases exponentially fast with N . Hence
we have the bound on Pr(A wins) stated in the theorem.
We next check whether the secrecy constraint is satisfied:
I (s; Yr (i) , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3) (68)
≤I (x; Yr (0)) + I (h; Yr (1) , Yr (2)) + I (s; Yr (3)) (69)
In (69), the first term decreases exponentially fast with respect to N due to Theorem 2. For
the second term, we have
I (h; Yr (1) , Yr (2)) ≤I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , Zr(1), h⊕ k
)
(70)
=I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , h⊕ k
)
(71)
=I (h; h⊕ k) + I
(
h; Y¯r (1) |h⊕ k
)
(72)
=I
(
h; Y¯r (1) |h⊕ k
)
(73)
≤I
(
h, k; Y¯r (1)
)
= I
(
k; Y¯r (1)
)
(74)
Hence, the second term is bounded by I(k, Y¯r(1), which also decreases exponentially fast with
respect to N due to Theorem 2. The third term decreases exponentially fast with respect to
dr log2 q
Re
due to Theorem 5. Hence (68) decreases exponentially fast with respect to N .
Finally, we check whether the confidential message W , which corresponds to s in our scheme,
can be transmitted reliably. We observe that the probability Pr(W 6= Wˆ ) does decrease expo-
nentially fast with respect to N because the decoding error probability of the lattice decoder
decreases at this speed, as stated in the end of Section IV.
The probability
Pr
(
Wˆ is not accepted by Node 2|W = Wˆ
)
(75)
depends on whether x, k, k⊕ h can be transmitted reliably. Since they are also transmitted with
the nested lattice code and decoded with a lattice decoder, the probability of decoding error
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when transmitting x, k, k ⊕ h also decreases exponentially with respect to the dimension of the
lattice, which in turn increases linearly with N . Hence (75) also decreases exponentially fast
with respect to N .
Hence we have proved the theorem.
Remark 9: It is evident from (63) that if Lemma 5 were weakened to just proving the left-
hand side converges to 0, which is the case if the conventional strong secrecy notion like the one
in [27] is used, then it would not be possible to preserve the exponentially decreasing detection
property offered by the AMD code. Hence in this problem, the commonly recognized strong
secrecy notion is insufficient, and a stronger notion, as described by (19), is required.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we developed a coding scheme which provides strong secrecy by combining
nested lattice codes and universal hash functions. In our previous work [23], the representation
theorem for nested lattice codes is used to bound the Shannon entropy. Here we showed the same
theorem is also useful in bounding another information theoretic measure, i.e., the Re´nyi entropy,
which in turn leads to the desired strong secrecy results in a Gaussian setting. We showed that
this coding scheme can be used with AMD codes to perform Byzantine detection for a Gaussian
two-hop network where the relay is both an eavesdropper and a Byzantine attacker. Using this
code, we showed that the probability that a Byzantine adversary wins decreases exponentially
fast with respect to the number of channel uses.
It should be noted that, in this work, we have assumed that the channel gains are known by
each node before the communication starts. It should be recognized that the Byzantine attacker
at the relay node may attempt to manipulate the channel estimation process, for example, by
broadcast incorrect pilot signals, to gain an advantage. Detection of this type of misbehavior is
closely related to the physical layer implementation of the system and is left as future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
When Λc = qΛ and the generation matrix of Λ has full rank, there are qN lattice points in
(Λ+dN)∩V (Λc). Each point in (Λ+dN)∩V (Λc) can be represented by its coordinates, which
is a vector composed of N integers: {c1, ..., cN}.
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We next prove the following mapping is an isomorphism from (Λ+dN)∩V (Λc) to the group
of a finite field GF(qN):
I : I(c1, ...cN) = {c1 mod q + (c2 mod q)x... + (cN mod q)xN−1} (76)
First we prove that two elements in (Λ+dN)∩V (Λc) can not be mapped to the same element
in GF(qN). This can be proved via contradiction: Suppose they can. Then, we have two points
x, and y, whose coordinates are {a1, ..., aN} and {b1, ..., bN} respectively, such that
ai − bi mod q = 0 i = 1, ..., N (77)
∃j, aj 6= bj (78)
This means x− y ∈ qΛ = Λc. Let z ∈ Λc be x− y. Then x = y + z and z 6= 0.
Define the quantization operator QΛc(x) as
QΛc(x) = argmin
t∈Λc
‖t− x‖ (79)
where ‖t−x‖ denotes the Euclidean distance between t and x. QΛc(x) has the following property:
∀z ∈ Λc, QΛc(x+ z) = QΛc(x) + z. This can be shown as follows:
QΛc(x+ z) = argmin
t∈Λc
‖t− x− z‖ (80)
= arg min
t−z∈Λc
‖(t− z)− x‖ (81)
= arg min
t′∈Λc
‖t′ − x‖+ z (82)
= QΛc(x) + z (83)
Since x, y ∈ V (Λc). This means QΛc(x) = 0 and QΛc(y) = 0 . However we can also write
QΛc(x) = QΛc(y + z) = QΛc(y) + z = z 6= 0. This leads to a contradiction.
Since I cannot map two different lattice points to the same field element, and the set (Λ +
dN) ∩ V (Λc) has the same cardinality as GF(qN), I must be a one-to-one mapping.
Finally, it is easy to verify that I preserves the addition operation:
I(x+ y) = I(x) + I(y) (84)
This completes the proof that I is an isomorphism.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
For the distribution for tNi , i = 1, 2 stated in Theorem 5, tN1 ⊕ tN2 is independent from tN1 .
Therefore:
H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN
)
= H2
(
tN1
)
= N0 (85)
Then, as in (26), with probability 1− 2−(s/2−1):
H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN , T = a
)
(86)
≥H2
(
tN1 |tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN
)
− log2 |T | − s = N0 −N − s (87)
We next use the fact that when G is uniformly distributed over the set of linear functions
from GF(2)N0 to GF(2)r0 , the following equation holds according to Theorem 4:
H
(
G
(
v(tN1 )
)
|G, tN1 ⊕ tN2 = tN , T = a
)
≥ r0 − 2
r0−c
ln 2
(88)
where c = N0 −N − s.
Hence
H
(
G
(
v(tN1 )
)
|G, tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T
)
≥
(
1− 2−(s/2−1)
)(
r0 − 2
r0−c
ln 2
)
(89)
In order for 2−(s/2−1) to decrease exponentially fast with respect to N , we choose s = εN ,
where 0 < ε < R0 − 1 so that c is positive. Choose r0 such that for δ > 0:
r0 < c−Nδ/2 = N0 −N − s−Nδ/2 (90)
so that 2r0−c decreases exponentially fast with respect to N . Recall by (38), we have N0 ≥
NR0 − 1. Hence a sufficient condition for (90) to hold is to require
r0 < N(R0 − 1)− s−Nδ (91)
This yields (40). For this r0 and s, from (89), we observe that there exists β > 0, such that
I
(
G
(
v(tN1 )
)
; tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T |G
)
≤ e−βN (92)
We next use the fact that for sufficiently large N , most G has full row rank as shown in Lemma
2. Therefore, under a uniform distribution for tNi , i = 1, 2, tN1 and tN2 being independent, there
must exists a G = g, such that
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1) g has full rank.
2) I
(
G
(
v(tN1 )
)
; tN1 ⊕ tN2 , T |G = g
)
≤ 2e−βN
Hence we have proved Theorem 5.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The following notation is used in the proof: Xi(j), i = 0, ..., 3, Xr(j) denote the signals
transmitted by node 1, 2 and the relay during the jth stage, j = 0, ..., 3. Similarly, Yi(j), i =
1, 2, Yr(j), Zr(j), ZR(j) denote the signals and channel noise observed during the jth stage.
Xˆr(i), i = 0, ..., 3 denotes the estimate for Xr(i) computed by node 2. To simplify the notation,
we omit the superscript for these signals which were used to indicate their dimensions.
As described in Section VI, the 0th stage is used to transmit x. The 1st stage is used to
transmit k. The 2nd stage is used to transmit k ⊕ h. The 3rd stage is used to transmit s.
We next explain how to upper bound the following quantity:
I (x; ∆x,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (93)
Let ⊕ in x⊕ y denote the addition operation in the field where x and y are taken from. Let −x
denote the element such that (−x)⊕x = 0. Recall that g is the linear mapping whose existence
is proved in Theorem 2. With these notations, we can write ∆x as:
∆x =g
(
Xˆr (0)⊕ (−X2 (0))
)
⊕ (−x) (94)
=g
(
Xˆr (0)⊕ (−X2 (0))
)
⊕ g (−X1 (0)) (95)
=g
(
Xˆr (0)⊕ (− (X2 (0)⊕X1 (0)))
)
(96)
Since ∆x is a function of Xˆr(0) and X2(0)⊕X1(0), (93) is upper bounded by:
I
(
x; Xˆr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0
)
(97)
Xˆr(0) is computed from Y2(0) by node 2. Hence (97) is upper bounded by:
I (x; Y2 (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (98)
≤I (x;Xr (0) , ZR (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (99)
=I (x;Xr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0)
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+ I (x;ZR (0) |Xr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ, s = s0) (100)
Recall that ZR(0) is the noise observed by Node 2 during the stage responsible for transmitting
x. We observe that it is independent from all the other terms in the second term of (100). This
is because ∆h, sˆ, s are only related to signals transmitted in later stages. The relay node has no
knowledge of ZR(0). Hence ZR(0) can not affect the relaying strategy. As a result, (100) equals
I (x;Xr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (101)
Recall that Mr denotes the randomness available to the relay node. Then, the expression in (101)
is upper bounded by
I (x;Mr, Xr (0) , Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (102)
=I (x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0)+
I (x;Xr (0) |Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ, s = s0) (103)
Since Xr(0) is computed from Yr(0) at the relay node, it is a deterministic function of Yr(0),
Mr and potentially s0. Hence the second term in (103) is 0, and (103) equals:
I (x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,∆h, sˆ|s = s0) (104)
We next examine ∆h in (104). Recall that u is defined as k ⊕ h. uˆ and kˆ are the estimates for
u and k computed by node 2 respectively. With these notations, we can express ∆h as:
∆h = uˆ⊕ (−kˆ)⊕ (−h) (105)
= uˆ⊕ ((−k)⊕ (−∆k))⊕ (−h) (106)
= uˆ⊕ (−(k ⊕ h))⊕ (−∆k) (107)
As seen from (105)-(107), ∆h is a function of uˆ, k ⊕ h, and ∆k. Therefore (104) can be upper
bounded by:
I (x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , uˆ, k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ|s = s0) (108)
Note that uˆ is computed from Y2(2) by node 2. Therefore (108) is upper bounded by:
I (x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Y2 (2) , k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ|s = s0) (109)
≤I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Xr (2) , ZR (2) , k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ|s = s0) (110)
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=I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Xr (2) , k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ|s = s0)
+ I(x;ZR (2) |Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Xr (2) , k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ, s = s0) (111)
Again ZR(2) is independent from all the other terms in the second term of (111). Hence (111)
equals:
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Xr (2) , k ⊕ h,∆k, sˆ|s = s0) (112)
For ∆k, we have:
∆k = g
(
Xˆr (1)⊕ (−X2 (1))
)
⊕ (−k) (113)
= g
(
Xˆr (1)⊕ (−X2 (1))
)
⊕ g (−X1 (1)) (114)
= g
(
Xˆr (1)⊕ (− (X2 (1)⊕X1 (1)))
)
(115)
Hence ∆k is a function of Xˆr(1), X2(1)⊕X1(1). Therefore (112) can be upper bounded by:
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Xˆr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ|s = s0) (116)
Xˆr(1) is computed from Y2(1) by node 2. Hence (116) is upper bounded by:
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Y2 (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ|s = s0) (117)
≤I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h,Xr (1) , ZR(1),
X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ|s = s0) (118)
=I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h,Xr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ|s = s0)
+ I(x;ZR(1)|Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) ,
k ⊕ h,Xr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ, s = s0) (119)
=I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , sˆ|s = s0) (120)
Finally, sˆ is computed from Y2(3), X2(3) by node 2. Hence (120) is upper bounded by:
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) ,
X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , Y2 (3) , X2 (3) |s = s0) (121)
≤I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) ,
X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , Xr (3) , X2 (3) |s = s0) (122)
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Since Xr(3) is a deterministic function of Mr, Yr(3) and potentially s0, we can upper bound
(122) with the following term by replacing Xr(3) with Yr(3):
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) ,
Yr (3) , X2 (3) |s = s0) (123)
≤ I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) ,
X1 (3) , Zr(3), X2 (3) |s = s0) (124)
Equation (124) follows from Yr(3) = X1(3) + X2(3) + Zr(3). We then use the fact that the
stochastic encoder used by node 1 to transmit s is independent from the stochastic mapping
used at other stages. Hence, we have:
I(x;X1 (3) , X2 (3) , Zr (3) |Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , (125)
Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) , s = s0) = 0 (126)
and (124) equals:
I(x;Mr, Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |s = s0) (127)
=I(x;Mr|s = s0)
+ I(x; Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, s = s0) (128)
Next we note that since I(x;Mr|s = s0) = 0, (128) equals:
I(x; Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, s = s0) (129)
Equation (129) is upper bounded by:
I(x, h; Yr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Yr (2) , k ⊕ h, Yr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, s = s0) (130)
Recall that the notation Y¯r, as introduced in (16), denotes the quantity obtained by subtracting
the channel noise Nr from Yr. Following this notation, we can upper bound (130) as:
I(x, h;Y¯r (0) , Zr (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,
Y¯r (2) , Zr (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , Zr (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, s = s0) (131)
= I(x, h;Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,
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Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0) (132)
which is further upper bounded by:
H
(
Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
+H
(
Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
−H(Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) , Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |
x, h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0) (133)
=H
(
Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
+H
(
Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
−H(Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) |x, h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0)
−H(Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) ,
x, h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0) (134)
We then use the two Markov chains shown below:
{
Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0)
}
− {x,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s} − h (135){
Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1)
}
− {h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s}
− {x, Y¯r(0), X1(0)⊕X2(0)} (136)
The Markov relation in (135) holds because given x, the distribution of {Y¯r (0), X1 (0)⊕X2 (0)}
only depends on the randomness in the transmitter of node 1 and 2 during stage 0. The Markov
chain in (135) follows because:
k ⊕ h− {h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s} − {x, Y¯r(0), X1(0)⊕X2(0)} (137)
and
{
Y¯r (2) , Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1)
}
− {k ⊕ h, h,Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s}
− {x, Y¯r(0), X1(0)⊕X2(0)} (138)
are Markov chains. Equation (137) is a Markov chain, because, given h, the distribution of k⊕h
only depends on k, which is independent from all the remaining terms in (137). Equation (138)
is a Markov chain, because, given k ⊕ h and h, which implies k is given, the distribution of
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{Y¯r (2), Y¯r (1),X1 (1) ⊕ X2 (1)} only depends on the randomness in the transmitter of node 1
and 2 during stage 1 and stage 2.
Applying the two Markov chains (135) and (136) to the last two terms in (134), we find that
it equals:
I
(
x; Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0) |Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
+ I
(
h; Y¯r (2) , k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Mr, Zr (i) , i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
(139)
For the first term in (139), since X1(0)⊕X2(0) = Y¯r(0) mod Λc and hence is a function of
Y¯r(0), we have
I
(
x; Y¯r (0) , X1 (0)⊕X2 (0)|Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
(140)
=I
(
x; Y¯r (0)|Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
= I
(
x; Y¯r (0)
)
(141)
Since x is extracted from a lattice point in GF(qN) based on the strong secrecy scheme described
in Section V-A1, from Theorem 2, we have I
(
x; Y¯r (0)
)
< 2 exp(−βN).
For the second term in (139), note that Y¯r(2) is just X1(2), because node 2 remains silent at
this stage. Therefore, this term can be expressed as:
I
(
h;X1(2), k ⊕ h, Y¯r (1) , X1 (1)⊕X2 (1)|Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
(142)
=I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , X1(2)|Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
+ I
(
h; k ⊕ h,X1 (1)⊕X2 (1) |Y¯r (1) , X1(2),Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
(143)
The second term in (143) is 0 since k⊕h is a deterministic function of X1(2) and X1(1)⊕X2(1)
is a deterministic function of Y¯r(1). Therefore (143) equals
I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , X1(2)|Mr, Zr(i), i = 1, 2, 3, s = s0
)
(144)
=I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , X1(2)
)
(145)
Since X1(2) is determined by h⊕ k, (145) is upper bounded by:
I
(
h; Y¯r (1) , h⊕ k
)
(146)
=I (h; h⊕ k) + I
(
h; Y¯r (1) |h⊕ k
)
(147)
=I
(
h; Y¯r (1) |h⊕ k
)
(148)
34
≤I
(
h, k; Y¯r (1)
)
= I
(
k; Y¯r (1)
)
(149)
Since k is extracted from a lattice point in GF(qN) based on the strong secrecy scheme
described in Section V-A1, hence from Theorem 2, (149) is bounded by 2 exp(−βN).
Therefore (139) is bounded by 4 exp(−βN). Hence we have Lemma 5.
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